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ABSTRACT

THE PROBLEM OF RELIGIOUS DIVERSITY:
A STUDY AND CRITIQUE OF THE PHILOSOPHY OF JOHN HICK

John K. Dryden, Jr.
Director: Osborne P. Wiggins
July 31, 2003

This thesis is a study and critique ofJohn Hick's pluralistic hypothesis as
presented in his book An Interpretation oj Religion. I primarily focus on two issues:
Hick's epistemology of religious beliefs and the pluralistic hypothesis itself. These are
two separate issues, but for Hick they prove to be inextricably linked. Hick uses his
epistemological stance to argue that there is an epistemological problem of religious
diversity. After he argues that there is a problem, he presents his solution, i.e. the
pluralistic hypothesis. After explaining these issues, my critique focuses upon the
connection between the two. I first critique Hick's epistemological stance and in so
doing argue that his hypothesis is unwarranted. I then argue that even if Hick's
epistemological position is correct, the problem of religious diversity is much broader
than Hick presents it and his hypothesis is much too limited in scope to adequately deal
with the problem.
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Introduction

Currently in the philosophy of religion, a debate over the problem of
religious plurality continues among many philosophers. John Hick, a leading
philosopher of religion who deals with this issue, cites the problem in the
following way:
... the most viable defence of religious belief has to be a defence of the
rationality of basing beliefs ... on religious experience. From the point of
view of a Christian philosopher - as distinguished from a philosopher
simply as such - there is, however, an obvious challenge to this in the fact
that the same epistemological principle establishes the rationality of Jews,
Muslims, Hindus, Buddhists etc. in holding beliefs that are at least partly,
and sometimes quite radically, incompatible with the Christian beliefsystem. 1
According to Hick, the traditional Christian assumption that Christianity is the 'one
true religion' undermines Christian philosophers' efforts to rationalize religious
belief by grounding it in religious experience. For "... if only one of the many
belief-systems based upon religious experience can be true, it follows that

religious experience generally produces false beliefs, and that it is thus a
generally unreliable basis for belief formation.,,2 We shall see that Hick argues
that you can either hold the view that there is only one true religion, or the view
that that religious experience justifies religious beliefs, but not both, for these are
contradictory positions.
I

2

John Hick, Dialogues in the Philosophy of Religion (New York: Palgrave, 2001) 25.
Hick, Dialogues in the Philosophy of Religion 26.

The purpose of this paper is to fully explicate and take a stance on the
debate of religious pluralism. I will do this by using the works of Hick, primarily
An Interpretation of Religion, as my focal and entry point into the debate. In
explicating the views of Hick, I will concentrate on two issues which for Hick are
inextricably linked. The first issue concerns the justification of religious beliefs
based upon religious experience; the second is Hick's pluralistic hypothesis.
These are certainly two separate issues, but for Hick, the first gives rise to the
second. Hick basically claims that the fact that religious beliefs are justified by
religious experience creates a problem, the problem of religious diversity. Hick's
solution to this problem is his pluralistic hypothesis.
After explaining Hick's position on the issue of the rationality of religious
beliefs and his pluralistic hypothesis, I will then present critiques of Hick's work
by other leading philosophers of religion. Last, I will reexamine the issue of the
justification of religious beliefs and argue that Hick's pluralistic hypothesis is
unwarranted. I will advocate the position of religious falliblism; that is, the
position that religious beliefs are inherently uncertain and possibly mistaken.
will support Hick's claim that it is rational to trust our experience, even if it is
religious experience, but argue that this does not lend itself to his version of
pluralism. It does, however, suggest that religious beliefs (among other types of
beliefs) should be accompanied with the realization that they could very well be
mistaken. Moreover, this position of religious fallibilism will help us "move
beyond the static situation of rival absolutisms." 3

3 John

Hick, Disputed Questions ill Theology and the Philosophy of Religion (New Haven: Yale UP, 1993)

154.
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Chapter 1
The Dialogue: An Introduction to the Problem of Religious Diversity

In Hick's book Dialogues in the Philosophy of Religion, is a dialogue

between Hick and William Alston that nicely presents the problem of religious
diversity. Before explaining this dialogue, let me first cover some basic
presuppositions of Hick's argument for the problem of religious diversity. A
central premise to Hick's argument is that the justification of religious belief must
be grounded in religious experience. Hick distinguishes between two types of
religious experience. "In the one kind the 'information' is mediated through our
material environment: things, events and processes in the world are experienced
as having a religious character or meaning in virtue of which they manifest to us
the presence of the transcendent".4 This first kind of religious experience is
common both to the ordinary believer and to the great prophets and leaders of
the various traditions. They occur in various forms and levels of intensity. This
experience can take the form of "the sense ... of one's life as being lived in the
presence of God; the consciousness of ordinary life as avidya (illusion) and of all

4

John Hick, An Interpretation of Religion (New Haven: Yale UP, 1989) 154.
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things as sunya (empty)".5 More generally it is "the whole experience of persons
in so far as they are religious.,,6
Distinguished from this type of religious experience is mystical experience,
which Hick defines as:
those forms of religious experience that express the presence of the Real,
not as manifested in our material environment, but as directly affecting the
human psyche. These are experiences in which the 'information' being
presented to consciousness has been received by some kind of extra7
sensory awareness of our ultimate environment.

This mystical experience can take the form of the unitive experience of the
oneness of God/Absolute etc. or the communitive experience of
visions/auditions. 8
Hick's premise that religious beliefs are justified via these types of
religious experience is critical to his argument for the problem of religious
diversity and will prove central in the dialogue with Alston. Prior to Pascal, most
philosophers tried to argue for the rationality of religious belief by making
arguments for the existence of God. Pascal took a different approach, arguing
that it is a greater risk not to believe in God than it is to believe in God. 9 While
Hick does not take this approach, he agrees with Pascal that "the justification of
theistic belief does not consist in an argument moving directly to the conclusion
that God exists but rather in an argument for the rationality of so believing
despite the fact that this cannot be proved or shown to be in any objective sense

Hick, An Interpretation
Hick, An Interpretation
7 Hick, An Interpretation
8 Hick, An Interpretation
9 Hick, An Interpretation
5
6

of Religion 154.
of Religion 154.
of Religion 165.
of Religion 165.
of Religion 211.
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more probable than not.,,10 Natural theology and classical philosophy of religion
has tried to show that theistic religious belief is rational by proving the existence
of God. If God's existence could be proven, it would of course be rational to
believe in God's existence. But this project has failed according to Hick, so he
takes this alternative approach.
For Hick, the impossibility of proving the existence of God is similar to the
impossibility of proving the existence of the external world. 11 While we cannot
prove the external world's existence, it is rational, and even necessary, for us to
trust our experience. "That is to say, we are so constituted that we cannot help
believing and living in terms of the objective reality of the perceived world.,,12 The
same is true for religious experience. Those who vividly experience their lives in
relation to a transcendent reality are behaving rationally when they trust this
experience and believe that this reality exists. In fact, such persons would be
irrational not to trust this experience.
Initially, John Hick has mahatmas, or people at the origin of the great
religions, in mind for people who experience a transcendent reality in this clear
and vivid manner. He uses the specific example of Jesus who "was vividly aware
of 'living in the unseen presence of God' as abba, father. God, as personal
loving will, was as real to him as his neighbours or as the hills and rivers and lake
of Galilee. The heavenly father was not a mere concept or a hypothetical entity,
but an experienced living reality ... ,,13

10

Hick, An Interpretation of Religion 2 J 1.

Hick, An Interpretation of Religion 213.
i2 Hick, An Interpretation of Religion 213.
ii
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Hick, An Interpretation of Religion 216.

5

After arguing for the rationality of religious belief of mahatmas based upon
their vivid religious experience, Hick then proceeds to answer the obvious
question concerning the religious beliefs of the ordinary person. While their
beliefs can never be as grounded as the beliefs of the great mahatmas, if "one
experiences one's own life religiously, even only occasionally and to some slight
extent, this makes it both possible and reasonable to be so impress~d by the
reports of the mahatmas that one's own experience is supported by their much
more massive awareness of the transcendent.,,14 So, for Hick, the rationality of
religious belief is always grounded in experience, whether it is the vivid
experience of the great religious leaders, or the less vivid experience of the
common person which then relates to the accounts of the mahatmas.
In the dialogue with William Alston, Hick argues that the central premise
that religious belief is justified only by religious experience undermines the
position that there is at most one true religion. The central issue in this dialogue
concerns the epistemology of religious beliefs. Hick begins to describe this
problem by pointing out that most contemporary philosophers of religion are in
agreement that "the most viable defence of religious belief has to be a defence of
the rationality of basing beliefs ... on religious experience." 15 This defense of
religious belief, however, poses problems for the Christian philosopher because
the epistemological stance applies not just to Christianity, but to the other world
religions as well. Thus, "the same epistemological principle establishes the
rationality of Jews, Muslims, Hindus, Buddhist etc. in holding beliefs that are at

14
15
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least partly, and sometimes quite radically, incompatible with the Christian beliefsystem.,,16
Hick cites Alston's proposed solution to the problem of religious diversity
as presented in his work Perceiving God: "Alston's solution to the problem is (in
briefest summary) that since we have at present no neutral way of establishing
which of the world religions is right, and since our own religion is both
theoretically and practically satisfactory to us, it is much more reasonable for us
to stay with it than to switch to another.,,17 Hick's critique hinges upon what he
takes as an assumption in Alston's position, namely that there can at most be
one true religion. Hick points out that the proposition 1) 'religious belief is rational
because it is based upon religious experience' and the proposition 2) 'there is at
most one true religion' are contradictory. "For if only one of the many belief
systems based upon religious experience can be true, it follows that religious
experience generally produces false beliefs, and that it is thus a generally
unreliable basis for belief-formation.,,18
Hick maintains that this contradiction is so strong that Alston's position is
unable, without 'radical adjustment' to "meet the challenge of religious diversity to
his experience based apologetic.,,19 Hick then alludes to his own position by
claiming that Alston's first proposition seems correct, but that it would be a "much

Hick,
Hick,
18 Hick,
19 Hick,
16

17
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Dialogues in
Dialogues in
Dialogues in

the
the
the
the
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stronger contribution if the doxastic practices of the other world religions could be
seen as further instances of it rather than as contradicting it.,,20
Alston's original response is very brief, but he answers Hick's critique in
two ways. According to Alston, Hick's position that the assumption of one true
religion necessitates that religious experience generally produces false belief,
and is therefore unreliable, is misleading. "First, it assumes that most of the
beliefs in each system contradict most of the beliefs in the others. But that is by
no means clear, and in the absence of any definite way of counting, it could not
be clear.,,21 Second, Alston claims that Hick misrepresents his view by inflating
the role that religious experience has in justifying religious beliefs. Alston
maintains that while religious experience is important for grounding religious
beliefs, it also interacts with other grounds such as natural theology and
revelation.

22

"Thus, even if the major religious belief systems are mostly in

contradiction, there is still the question of the extent to which this is to be laid at
the door of religious experience.,,23
Alston additionally points out that even if the beliefs grounded in religious
experience were false, that would not contradict the epistemological claims he
makes for religious experience. 24 Here, Alston claims that religious beliefs based
upon religious experience are only prima facie justified; that is, they can be

Hick, Dialogues in the Philosophy of Religion 27.
William Alston, "Section 2(i)(b)," Dialogues in the Philosophy of Religion, cd. John Hick (New York:
Palgrave, 200 I) 37.
22 Alston, 37.
23 Alston, 37.
24 Alston, 38.
20

21
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overridden by other factors. He does not explain this position thoroughly until his
second response.
In the next section, Hick responds to each of Alston's points in direct
fashion. Concerning Alston's first point that it is not clear that most of the beliefs
in each system contradict most of the beliefs in the other, Hick answers that while
this is true, his argument only requires that the central beliefs

contra~ict

one

another, which can hardly be denied to be the case. "So I do not think that
Alston's first response deflects the criticism that it is intended to deflect. He has
pointed out, correctly, that his position does not apply to al/ religious beliefs, but it
still does apply to the most central ones.,,25 Hick also grants that Alston's
position in his book Perceiving God does include that other factors, such as
natural theology and revelation, are at play in grounding religious belief in
rationality, creating a 'mutual evidential network'. But this does not alleviate the
problem of religious diversity. Even if one were to grant that these other factors
are involved, each of the great world religions would still be "epistemically equally
well based, supported by religious experience, supposed revelation, revered
scripture, inspiring role models and a more general uplifting effect in people's
lives; and natural theologies that would exclude the non-theistic faiths by
providing a personal Creator, do not succeed in doing SO.,,26
The last section of the dialogue is a fuller response from Alston to the
criticism of Hick. He notes that there are two assumptions that he must hold in
order for Hick's criticism to be valid. The first is that there is a good amount of

25
26
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incompatibility between the beliefs of the world religions. The second is that, of
these incompatible beliefs, a good amount of them are grounded in religious
experience, or as Alston states "mystical perception".
What Hick needs for his criticism is merely that I accept these
assumptions. And this is how his premise that I hold that 'Christianity is
the only fully true religion' comes into the argument. For, as noted above,
he derives from this that I am thereby committed to holding that 'religious
experience within other religions produces beliefs that are false in so far
as they are incompatible with Christian belief'. But it is very important to
27
note that this consequence need not be so derived.
So, the rest of this response is dedicated to the task of showing that it is not
religious experience in and of itself that produces false beliefs.
Alston states that he is "prepared to acknowledge that ... there is a
considerable degree of incompatibility between central beliefs of different
religions,,28, but that is detrimental to his argument only if the incompatibilities
result from mystical perception-based beliefs. However, mystical perception
mainly produces 'manifestation' beliefs, or "beliefs as to what perceivable
features God has and as to what He is doing vis-a-vis the subject.,,29 These
manifestation beliefs, however, are not the source of incompatibilities between
the major religions. Incompatible beliefs between the world religions have to do
with "the central beliefs about the Ultimate, its (his, her) nature, general activities,
purposes, etc., rather than how it is related to this or that individual, or what its
perceivable features are.,,30

Alston, 43.
Alston, 44.
29 Alston, 44.
30 Alston, 45.
27
28
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Alston attempts to further his defense by introducing the notion of an
'overridder system' which was only touched upon in his first response. "Religious
experience can provide significant justification for religious beliefs only if it is set
in the context of an 'overridder system' for assessing the credentials of any
particular belief based on that experience.,,31 An overridder system basically just
consists of the central beliefs of a particular religion, so that each religion can be
said to be an overridder system from which mystical experience-based beliefs
can be judged. But if the system itself is faulty, it will incorrectly assess the
beliefs. "Thus, if a considerable proportion of the beliefs of a religion are false,
mystical perception within that religion cannot be relied on to produce mostly true
beliefs, since the overridder system employed, containing many false beliefs,
cannot be depended on to separate the wheat from the chaff.,,32
John Hick does not respond to this response, and the dialogue ends here.
But it is easy to anticipate how Hick might respond. First of all, by introducing the
notion of the overridder system, Alston has shifted the power of justification of
religious beliefs from religious experience to the overridder system, or the religion
itself. Hick notes in his original critique of Alston that Alston maintains that "the
most viable defence of religious belief has to be a defence of the rationality of
basing beliefs (with many qualifying provisos which Alston has carefully set forth)
on religious experience.,,33 (emphasis added) But these many qualifying provisos
diminish the importance of religious experience in rationalizing religious beliefs.
Alston's position seems to be that religious experience rationalizes religious
31
32
33

Alston, 45.
Alston, 45.
Hick, Dialogues in the Philosophy of Religion 25.
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beliefs, but only if they are in line with a satisfactory system, or, in other words, a
true religion. But Alston himself admits that he gives no criteria for which to
judge the various overridder systems. Alston recognizes that his case for
religious experience must form a part of a cumulative case for Christianity: "the
final stage of my programme was missing. I shied away from any attempt
critically to evaluate the Christian belief system in general.,,34 While Alston
believes that the defense of Christianity on neutral grounds "can be given some
substance,,35, he admits that this has not yet been done. Hick is correct in
maintaining that until this is done, the problem of religious pluralism seems to
remain for the exclusivist.
This dialogue serves as a good introduction into the problem of religious
pluralism for a number of reasons. First, it begins to highlight the three main
positions: exclusivism, inclusivism, and pluralism. Exclusivism maintains that
there is only one true religion and that adherence to that one true religion is the
only way to achieve the only religious end. The inclusivist also maintains that
there is only one fully true religion, but also holds the belief that people of other
religions can achieve salvation. For instance, the Christian inclusivist claims that
Christianity is the only true religion, but the grace of God and the power of Christ
are sufficient to include adherents of other religions. Finally, the pluralist believes
that there is no one true religion. Rather, all of the major religions are on equal
footing in their relation to the transcendent.

34
35

Alston, 48.
Alston, 38.
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This dialogue also serves as a good introduction because through the
method of critique, Hick is able to argue why there is a need for his positive work,
his pluralistic hypothesis. Ultimately, I contend that Hick and Alston are at an
impasse which is caused by their fundamentally different views on the
importance of religious experience. We have seen how Alston's qualifying
provisos diminished the importance of religious experience in his philosophy. But
for Hick, religious experience proves central for establishing the rationality of
religious belief, and is, consequently, fundamental to his hypothesis.
As was shown in this dialogue, anyone who holds the position that
religious experience is what grounds religious belief in rationality invites the
problem of religious pluralism. "For if the different kinds of religious experience
justify people in holding incompatible sets of beliefs developed within the different
traditions, has not our justification for religious belief thereby undermined
itself?,,36 If we accept Hick's argument of the rationality of religious beliefs, we
seem to be faced with this problem. In an attempt to solve this problem, Hick
posits his hypothesis.

! :

36

Hick, An Interpretation of Religion 228.
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Chapter 2
Explanation of Hick's Pluralistic Hypothesis

In the briefest way, Hick's pluralistic hypothesis can be stated as follows:
"The great post-axial faiths constitute different ways of experiencing, conceiving
and living in relation to an ultimate divine Reality which transcends all our varied
versions of it.,,37 To flesh this out, Hick begins by making a distinction between
'the Real' [the transcendent divine reality] an sich and 'the Real' as humanly
experienced by different people. The Real' an sich is 'the Real' as it is
independent of people's experiences of it. It is 'the Real' in itself, as it is unable
to be perceived. Distinguished from 'the Real' an sich is 'the Real' as it is
humanly experienced. This is not 'the Real' as it is in itself, but 'the Real' as it
appears to human consciousness. Moreover, this appearance to human
consciousness occurs in myriad ways. The Real' appears to different people in
different cultural and historical contexts in different ways. This then accounts for
the plurality of religious traditions.
In order to fully understand the second half of Hick's distinction, one must
first understand his views on experience, or as he calls it, 'experience-as'. Hick
argues that we never just passively experience any object, but always
experience objects as something. That is, we always bring a certain background
37
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and certain theories to experience. He borrows this idea from Wittgenstein, but
expands it to cover more area than Wittgenstein intended. Wittgenstein wrote
about ambiguous picture puzzles, in which the picture could be seen in one of
two ways. For instance, the picture may be seen as a young French woman
looking to the right or, conversely, as an old witch looking to the left. Given the
ambiguity, Wittgenstein pointed out that we have to see the picture as one or the
other, so we just don't see the picture.
Whereas Wittgenstein limited this 'seeing-as' to the puzzle picture, Hick
contends that all seeing is seeing-as and even all experience is experience-as.
To show this, Hick uses the example of seeing a fork on the table. The fork is so
familiar an object that it seems strange to say that we are seeing the object on
the table as a fork. "However we have more usual names for ordinary seeing-as
in real life: we call it 'recognising' or 'identifying.",38 Even in the everyday
occurrence of seeing a fork, we are seeing it as a utensil for eating. However,
the only reason why we see the fork as a utensil for eating is because we bring to
this experience a certain background. We come from a culture, time, and place
where objects of this type are used for eating, so we see them as such.
However, someone from a very different culture might not see the fork as
a tool for food consumption. Depending on their background, they may see it as
a piece of decorative art, a hair comb, or an object to be feared and worshipped.
I

I

"But they would not have the concept of a fork with which to identify it as a fork.

38
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Indeed to say that they do not have this concept and that they cannot perform the
act of recognition are two ways of saying the same thing.,,39
For Hick, experiencing-as, or more specifically seeing-as, is to apply a
linguistic concept to an object being perceived. This process of concept applying
is something humans do automatically when they focus upon objects. I cannot
look outside my window and see a chimney without applying the concept of
chimney to it; I automatically see it as having a certain use and function. This
concept is created by the linguistic environment of which I am a part. ''These
conceptual creations are the inner skeletons structuring the various forms of life,
or ways of being human, that constitute the different cultures of the earth.,,4o
The notion of experience-as is crucial to understanding the second half of
the distinction of 'the Real', that is 'the Real' as humanly experienced. For this
notion of experience-as not only applies to forks and picture puzzles, but also to
human experiences of the Real. When someone experiences the Real, they
automatically apply their linguistic concepts to it. The way they experience the
Real is shaped by their language, culture and history; it is shaped by their 'way of
being human'.
Given that there are multiple ways of being human and that the Real is
always experienced through this lens, the fact of religious pluralism begins to be
explained. On this hypothesis, while the Real an sich is what all of the great
religions are related to, multiplicity occurs not because all religion is illusion and
imagination, nor because one religion is right while others are deluded or

39
40
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incomplete, but because all experience of the Real is 'experience-as'. Just as
seeing the picture puzzle as a young French woman is just as valid as seeing it
as the old witch, so each of the great religions are equally valid experiences of
the Real.
There is also a limiting nature to the notion of experience-as. By seeing
the fork as a utensil for food consumption, I have limited my experience of it to
that concept. I am therefore unable, at the same time, to experience it as a piece
of decorative art or an object to be feared and worshipped. Likewise, the
experience of the Real as a personal deity, as in Jewish experience, is limited to
that concept. If I experience the Real as a personal deity, I am unable, at the
same time, to experience it as a non-personal absolute common in Buddhist
experience. So while all of the major religions are equally valid ways of
experiencing the Real, they are all also limited and incomplete.
In developing his hypothesis, Hick draws heavily upon the philosophy of
Kant. He does not draw upon Kant's epistemology of religion, but upon his
understanding of sense perception, which is then expanded by Hick to formulate
his own epistemology of religion. In examining sense perception, Kant noticed
that the same object could be perceived differently by different people. This led
him to distinguish between the world an sich, as it is itself, unperceived and the
world as perceived by finite minds. He used the term 'noumenon' to refer to the
I

I

former and the term 'phenomenon' for the latter.
Hick expands Kant's insight of sense perception to cover religious
experience. Kant showed that we sense perceive objects, which gives rise to us

17

postulating the objects' noumenal existence. Hick claims that we religiously
experience the Real which gives rise to the postulation of the Real as it is itself.
It is important, however, to note that the 'noumenon' for Kant is not knowable by
any human faculty and the phenomenon has empirical reality. "Analogously,
[Hick wants] to say that the noumenal Real is experienced and thought by
different human mentalities.,,41 These different experiences are "not illusory but
are empirically, that is experientially, real as authentic manifestations of the
Real.,,42 So, it seems that it might be dangerous to view this as a
Reality/appearance distinction because the term appearance suggests a lack of
reality. For Hick, a phenomenon of the Real has empirical reality, just as the
phenomenon of the chimney outside my window has empirical reality.
Before moving on to see how this hypothesis plays out, there are a couple
of obvious questions, upon which certain critiques of Hick are based, which Hick
addresses. First of all, why does Hick maintain that each of the traditions is
experiencing the same transcendent? Could it not be the case that for each
religion the noumenon behind the phenomenon is different and distinct? To
answer this, Hick appeals to Ockham's razor. "The 'truthfulness' of each tradition
is shown by its soteriological effectiveness. But what the traditions severally
regard as ultimates are different and therefore cannot all be truly ultimate. They
can however be different manifestations of the truly Ultimate within different
streams of human thought-and-experiences - hence the postulation of the Real

41
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an sieh as the simplest way of accounting for the data.,,43 Secondly, why

postulate the Real an sieh at all? "The answer is that the divine noumenon is a
necessary postulate of the pluralistic religious life of humanity.,,44 He argues that
if the Real an sieh is not postulated then one must take either the position that
religious experience is illusory or the position that the only religious experience
that is not illusory is one that comes from one particular tradition or stream of
thought. "But for those to whom neither of these options seems realistic the
pluralistic affirmation becomes inevitable, and with it the postulation of the Real
an sieh, which is variously experienced and thought as the range of divine

phenomena described by the history of religion.,,45
To further develop his hypothesis, Hick turns toward the task of showing
how this hypothesis has played itself out in the history of religion. He notices two
main ways in which the Real has been experienced, as personae and as
impersonae. Concerning the personae, Hick shows that all of the major religious
traditions have thought of the transcendent reality in personal terms. This, of
course, is obvious in the Semitic traditions, but Hick shows that it is not limited to
them. For example, in Mahayana Buddhism, "Buddha has been elevated, not
merely by popular imagination but by religious reflection, from the greatest of
human teachers to a being of universal power and significance" and "is referred
to in the Lotus Sutra as Devatideva, supreme god of the gods.,,46 Even the
adherents of the more philosophical traditions, such as Taoism and
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Confucianism, "seem to have needed to think of the transcendent as a personal
reality or realities, able to be approached by means of ritual, prayer and
sacrifice.,,47
After Hick demonstrates the pervasiveness of personal deities in the major
world religions, which according to his hypothesis would be the pervasiveness of
the Real being experienced in a variety of personal ways, he then turns to the
task of examining these experiences phenomenologically.
Given that there is this almost universal propensity of the human mind to
think-and-experience the presence of the Real in personal terms, what is
the status and nature, from the point of view of our pluralistic hypothesis,
of the numerous gods, goddesses and mono-deities? As an approach to
this question we shall do well first to take note of their phenomenological
character. 48
Hick distinguishes between experiences of the Real and philosophical or
theological reflections of the Real; or as Pascal labeled the distinction, "between
the God 'of the philosophers and scholars' and the 'God of Abraham, God of
Isaac, God of Jacob.",49 He notes that the experienced personae of the Real are
never experienced as infinite. Infinity is a concept that exceeds experience and,
according to Hick, has been attributed to God through the second order business
of philosophy and theology, not through religious experience. 5o In Jewish
experience certain qualities of God, such as goodness or justness, may be
experienced as unending in the sense that they extend beyond the experiential
horizons of the one who experiences God, but this is not an experience of infinity.
"But the point [Hick wants] to stress is that the experienced divine personae are
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not phenomenologically infinite, although - according to our hypothesis - they
are manifestations within finite human experience of the Real which, being truly
ultimate, has no limits.,,51
Hick develops his concept of divine personae by way of analogy with the
psychological concept of personae. He writes that a person is made up of
character and personality. 'The character is the underlying and only slowly
changing ground-plan which the personality expresses, whilst the personality is
the conscious surface [or public 'face'] which lives in interaction with other
selves.,,52 The character of a person is analogous to the Real an sich and the
personality of a person is analogous to the various divine personae taken as a
whole. A persona of a person is "a role that one builds within a certain group,,53
and a particular persona of a person is, of course, analogous to a particular
persona of the Real, otherwise known as a deity.
According to our hypothesis the Real is always present to human life, with
our capacity for religious awareness; and in its theistic forms that
presence consists in various divine personae who are known in different
streams of religious history. Each of these has an experienced social
reality and power within the life of the worshipping community in relation to
which it has been formed, and it constitutes the Real as perceived and
responded to by that community.54
Hick admits that this analogy is not perfect, for it is not a greater self that is
behind the various divine personae, but simply the ultimate ground beyond
human conception. But it does serve as a nice model that clarifies and develops
the pluralistic hypothesis.
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The question of the ontological status of these various divine personae
remains for Hick to answer. In an attempt to do this, Hick suggests two possible
models, the Christian doctrine of the trinity and the Buddhist trikaya doctrine, and
ultimately contends that the latter is the best model for the present purposes.
According to this doctrine, there are three modes of the infinite Buddha-natur~.
Hick concerns himself primarily with the second mode, the Sambhogakaya,
which is "the 'Body of Bliss', consisting in a plurality of transcendent Buddhas.,,55
The ontological status of this 'Body of Bliss' has been traditionally understood in
two ways. The first way sees the body as mental creations that become so vivid
that they acquire a subjective reality.
To clarify this, Hick compares it to the parapsychological concept of
'veridical hallucinations'. This occurs when one person is made telepathically
aware of another person's death via a vision of that person. "The experience is
technically hallucinatory in that there is no physical body in the region of space
which the apparition seems to occupy .... But it is a veridical hallucination in that
through it authentic information about B is being transmitted to A.,,56 If
understood in this way, the experienced divine persona (while not usually
experienced visually) has no objective reality, but it does "constitute a
transformation of authentic information of which the Real is the ultimate
source.,,57 Given that the source of the persona is the Real, it would still be
appropriate to worship this persona. For whether or not the worshipper realized
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its subjectiveness, the persona would still be a means of mediating the
relationship between herself and the Real. 58
In Buddhist tradition, the Sambhogakaya has also been understood to
have objective reality so that the transcendent Buddhas are objectively existing,
supernatural beings. 59 "Applying this conception to Jahweh, Vishnu, Allah,
Shiva, the heavenly Father and so on it would follow that they are real personal
beings, independent centres of consciousness, will, thought and emotion.,,6o If
this is correct it must be remembered that these personal beings are not infinite,
"for each exists alongside and is limited by the others with their particular natures
and capacities.,,61 Ultimately, Hick does not answer the question of the
ontological status of the personal phenomenon of the Real. He states that "the
pluralistic hypothesis being propounded here could accommodate either of these
models and does not require a decision between them. It therefore seems wise
not to insist upon settling a difficult issue which, in logic, the hypothesis itself
leaves open.,,62
After developing his hypothesis by explaining the concept of the personae
of the Real, Hick then extends his hypothesis to include what he calls the
Impersonae of the Real. From the point of view of the pluralistic hypothesis,
Impersonae are manifestations of the Real as non-personal, religious Absolutes.
Hick deals specifically with the Hindu absolute of Brahman and the Buddhist
i

I

absolute of NirvanaiSunyata. Concerning Brahman, he distinguishes between
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nirguna Brahman and saguna Brahman. ''The highest reality, containing no
element of illusion, is nirguna Brahman, Brahman without attributes, beyond the
scope of human thought and imagination. Less high, because involving some
element of illusion, is saguna Brahman, Brahman with attributes, known as
Ishwara, the personal creator and lord of the universe.,,63 Hick then further
distinguishes satchitananda, which Brahman is also often called. This, however,
is not a deity like sag una Brahman, but a mystical state of being, pure
consciousness and bliss. Given that nirguna Brahman is completely ineffable,
beyond all human concepts, Hick cites it as being equal to the Real an sich while
saguna and satchitananda Brahman are different phenomenal manifestations of
the Real. "In offering this proposal from the standpoint of the pluralistic
hypothesis I am treating the trans-personal reality of satchitananda . .. and the
personal Reality of Ishwara ... as alternative manifestations of the Real to our
human consciousness. Thus in this formulation the Real an sich is equated with
nirguna Brahman, whilst both satchitananda and Ishwara are identified forms of
saguna Brahman.,,64
When considering Buddhism and its relation to the pluralistic hypothesis,
Hick concentrates on two concepts: Nirvana and Sunyata. These two concepts
are central to two different branches of Buddhism, Theravada and Mahayana
Buddhism respectively. For Theravada Buddhism, Nirvana is the mystical
experience achieved when liberation from bondage to the ego occurs. "From the
point of view of our pluralistic hypothesis Nirvana is the Real experienced in an
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ineffable ego-Iessness, unlimited and eternal, which can be entered by the moral
and spiritual path taught by Buddha.,,65 According to the hypothesis, the
Mahayana experience of Sunyata is also an experience of the Real, not as it is in
itself, but through a particular cultural lens.
The Mahayana tradition claims that Sunyata is an unmediated experience
of the Absolute, but Hick concludes by arguing that this is in all probability not the
case.
However does not the fact that there are a number of different traditions of
unitive mysticism, offering their characteristically different reports of the
nature of the Real, make it seem more likely that the otherwise universal
structure of human consciousness holds here also, and that that which is
being directly experienced is not the Real an sich but the Real manifested
respectively as Sunyata, as Brahman, as God?66
For Hick, the data of multiple but different and seemingly incompatible claims to
unitive experience with the Ultimate Reality suggests that even in highly mystical
experiences, the mind still "operates with culturally specific concepts and that
what is experienced is accordingly a manifestation of the Real rather than the
postulated Real an sich.,,67
Thus far, we have seen through the Hick!Alston debate why Hick
maintains that there is a problem of religious diversity that needs to be
addressed. I have explained Hick's solution to this problem, which is his
pluralistic hypothesis. I have further shown the way this hypothesis has played
itself out in the history of religion. I will now turn my attention to various critiques
I

of Hick's hypothesis before giving my own critique and response.
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Chapter 3
Critiques

One type of critique that will be presented concerns Hick's overall
empiricist position, specifically in his argument for the meaningfulness of religious
language, and how this position relates to his hypothesis. Before presenting
these critiques, I will first cover what this basic empiricist position entails for Hick
and how he uses it to argue for religious meaningfulness.
Beginning in the 1920's, the philosophical movement of logical positivism,
which was associated with empiricism, argued for the 'verifiability criterion of
meaning'. This is the notion that in order for a proposition to be cognitively
meaningful, it must be able to be verified through observation. Given that God's
existence is unable to be verified through observation, religious propositions
were excluded and deemed cognitively meaningless.
Hick claims that while the logical positivist movement is a thing of the past,
some of their central insights are not a thing of the past and need to be
addressed presently. In his paper "Eschatological Verification Reconsidered"
(1977), Hick writes that "the central core of the positivist contention seems
undeniable. For it is simply the basic empiricist position that to exist, or to be the
case, is to make a difference. That is to say, to assert that x exists is to assert an
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in-principle-observable difference between the actual universe and a possible
universe which differs from it only in that the latter does not include

X.,,68

Hick

notes that the assumption of the logical positivist that this in-principle-observable
difference must be of the kind detected in sense data was simply 'an a priori
dogma,.69 However, despite this positivist dogma, "it is a perfectly good question
to ask one who asserts that God exists, or that a divine purpose is being fulfilled
in human life, what in-principle-experienceable difference it makes whether God
exists or whether a divine purpose is being fulfilled in human life.,,70
What, then, counts as an experienceable difference? To answer this, Hick
distinguishes between simple and complex verifiability. The truth values of
certain statements are able to be verified by simple observation. These include
statements like ''There is a table in the next room". One can simply look into the
next room, see the table, and thus verify the truth of the statement. Other
propositions (ex. "John Smith is an honest man") require cumulative
observations. Theistic statements, along with most scientific theories, belong to
this second variety. "This distinction between simple and complex verifiability
enables us to avoid a wrong approach to the question of the verification of
theistic statements. We should not ask, what single observation would verify
them, but what development of our experience would progressively confirm them
to the point at which there is no longer any room for rational doubt? .,,71
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Thus, according to Hick, the verifiability of the claims of the particular
theistic traditions consists not in a direct observation of God, but "in experiencing
features of the universe, as it changes through time, which trace the difference
that the existence of God makes. These constitute the fulfillment of the divine
purpose for creation.,,72 Accordingly, if the claims of Islam or of Christianity are
true, we will be able to verify this in the eschaton, when our awareness of God
will "no longer be in tension with the circumstances of sin and suffering, ugliness
and deprivation, which at present leave room for rational doubt.,,73
In his article entitled ''The Pluralistic Hypothesis, Realism, and PostEschatology", S. Mark Heim gives an internal critique of John Hick's work An
Interpretation of Religion. He criticizes Hick on a number of fronts. He argues

that two of Hick's arguments, the argument for religious meaningfulness and the
justification of religious belief, do not support his pluralistic hypothesis.
Moreover, he argues that these two arguments, taken together, "raise serious
questions about whether Hick's hypothesis actually succeeds in asserting a
meaningful truth claim.,,74
Heim summarizes Hick's argument for religious meaningfulness and
mentions Hick's contention that "religious convictions and faith are meaningful
and have cognitive content precisely because there are conditions under which
evidence sufficient for determination of their truth or falsehood will obtain.,,75 Hick
argues that religious content is meaningful because there is a situation in which
Hick, An interpretation of Religion 178.
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the claims of a particular religion can be verified. While they cannot be verified
currently, eschatological verification makes religious claims meaningful.
Heim turns this argument around on Hick. He claims that if possible
verification is what makes claims meaningful, then there are serious doubts. as to
whether claims of the pluralistic hypothesis are meaningful.
However, the sole religiously significant content which Hick allots to the
religious traditions - that there is a noumenal ultimate Real impinging
upon us, in relation with which humans are transformed by realitycenteredness toward a limitlessly better possibility - must itself be subject
to eschatological verification to be meaningful and true. If not, then Hicks
tenacious argument for a realistic verses a non-realistic view of religion
has the ironic effect of vindicating the truth value of the particular religious
76
traditions but denying it to his own pluralistic hypothesis.
Heim then asks the obvious question. What possible situation would confirm
that there is a noumenal Real behind all of the great religions in relation to which
the religious are being transformed to a 'limitlessly better possibility'.
Heim maintains that the pluralistic hypothesis, as stated by Hick, is in
principle unverifiable even under eschatological circumstances for two reasons.
"First, it is hard to see how any experience of fulfillment could constitute
verification of a 'limitlessly better possibility,.,,77 Even if a post-mortem or
eschatological experience surpassed all of our hopes, how could we ever know it
to be limitlessly better?
Secondly, and more importantly, "whatever experience of beatitude might
be encountered in such a condition, the assertion that it is a single noumenal
'Real' which is the source of this experience is just what could not be verified.,,78
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Heim argues this point by showing that Hick's notion of experience ('experience
as') would still apply eschatologically and prevent one from experiencing the Real
an sieh, or, in other words, experience the Real as it is unable to be experienced.

Hiem points out that Hick might object that any eschatological fulfillment or
combination of eschatological fulfillments is compatible with his hypothesis. But
Heim argues that, while this is true, it is just a further suggestion that the
hypothesis is empty.79 Even if the eschaton were experienced by a Christian as
conforming exactly or very closely to what the Christian belief system says to
expect, this also would be compatible with Hick's hypothesis. But it by no means
verifies it, for this experience would also be compatible with the Christian
exclusivist position. ''The fact of the matter is that any such fulfillment would be
powerful evidence for the cognitive validity of that specific religious tradition or
combination of traditions and their accounts of themselves, in preference to
Hick's account. There would be nothing at all distinctively confirmatory of Hick's
hypothesis in such a situation, since his hypothesis asserts something over and
above the specific traditions."so
Heim's main critique thus far seems to be as follows: Hick holds the
position that in order for a proposition to be meaningful it must have the
possibility of being verified through experience. It is evident that Hick holds this
position; otherwise he would not feel the need to appeal to eschatological
verification in his argument for religious meaningfulness. However, Hick's idea of
the noumenal "Real" is the Real as it is unable to be experienced. If the
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noumenal "Real" is unable to be experienced, it seems that this condition would
also apply in the eschaton. Therefore, Hick's propositions concerning the
noumenal "Real", even those propositions simply asserting its existence, are
meaningless. Therefore, while arguing for the meaningfulness of the language of
particular religions, he has denied meaningfulness to his pluralistic hypothesis.
After Heim uses Hick's argument for religious meaningfulness against his
pluralistic hypothesis, he does the same with Hick's argument for the justification
of religious belief. Heim states that Hick is unwarranted to move from the fact
that beliefs from different traditions are equally justified to the hypothesis that
there is one noumenal object behind all their views. "This hardly follows. The
thought just outlined leans heavily on the implicit suggestion that equally justified
beliefs ought in some sense to be equally true (or false)."s1
At this point of the critique, however, Heim is guilty of misrepresenting
Hick's argument. Hick is not claiming that there is a logical connection between
the fact that there are different, seeming incompatible, justified religious beliefs
and his pluralistic hypothesis. His hypothesis is just that, a hypothesis. It is a
position tentatively assumed and its successfulness will be determined by how
well it makes sense of certain facts and experiences. It is not meant to be
something deduced from facts.
However, Heim continues to the strongest part of the critique when he
argues that Hick's hypothesis is completely irieffective precisely because it is
compatible with every possible state of affairs and that it is impossible to either
verify it or falsify it. To argue this, Heim again draws on Hick's argument for the
81
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justification of religious beliefs. Heim notices that in Hick's argument for the
rationality of religious beliefs that "it is only the current justification of belief which
is unaffected by future falsification. Under some future conditions, such religious
beliefs might no longer be justified. Hick however does not present his
hypothesis as a belief justified pending circumstances which will decide its
validity, but apparently as a belief justified under any set of future
circumstances.,,82
This critique is, of course, parallel to his first argument. In the first he
argues that Hick's hypothesis does not have the potential to be verified, even
eschatologically. Even on Hick's own terms, this would make his hypothesis
meaningless. In the second argument, Heim contends that Hick's hypothesis
does not have the potential to be falsified. Given that it can be neither verified or
falsified, Hick's hypothesis is unworkable and empty. "In short, the pluralistic
hypothesis is a religious claim which falls afoul of the charge of emptiness
against which Hick has fought so valiantly to defend religious claims in
general.,,83
I contend that the critique given here by Heim poses a great challenge to
the overall philosophy of John Hick. In chapter eleven of An Interpretation of
Religion, Hick defends religious language against the charge of meaninglessness
posed by the verificationist. If this chapter is viewed as being completely
separate from the rest of the book, particularly the pluralistic hypothesis, then
there is no real problem. The verificationists pose a challenge to religious
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language, and Hick defends religious language against the challenge through his
notion of eschatological verification. But Hick fails to realize that this exact same
challenge can be addressed to the language of his pluralistic hypothesis and he
will not be able to respond in the same way.
Dr. Chester Gillis, in his article entitled "An Interpretation of An
Interpretation of Religion", also focuses on Hick's appeal to verification ism as a

point of critique. Unlike Heim, he does not notice how Hick's concession to
verificationism could possibly be devastating to his hypothesis, but simply states
that Hick should not appeal to this in his attempt to argue for religious
meaningfulness.
Hick's continued concern with empiricism, particularly the logical-positivist
variety, seems to be a concession to the validity of the whole enterprise of
logical-positivism. Most scholars have dismissed this long ago as ill-fated
and unworthy of further consideration. The criteria of the logical positivists
are simply not well founded or acceptable. To continue to try to answer
the question of the referent of religion on the grounds established by
84
logical positivism is to concede validity to those grounds.
Gillis' critique suggests a possible way for Hick to avoid the critique raised by
Heim. If, as Gillis suggests, Hick could abandon concessions to logical
positivism and verification ism and, instead, critique the entire enterprise, then
perhaps, in so doing, he could support his claim to religious meaningfulness and
at the same time avoid putting his entire hypothesis in jeopardy. But, judging
from Hick's response to Gillis, in which he simply restates his argument given in
his 1977 paper explained above, this seems to be a step he is unwilling to take.
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Another strong critique comes from Paul Eddy who charges Hick with
offering a hyper-subjectivist model and that, in the end,this necessarily must
lead him to a Feuerbachian non-realism. He notes that Hick wants to retain a
realist core, i.e. the noumenal Real, but be able to explain at the same time the
diversity of understandings of this Real. The key to this is his insistence of the
ineffability of the noumenal Real. "In this manner, he offers a religious realist as opposed to a naturalistic - interpretation of religion, while at the same time
allowing the subjectivist component to create the space for radically divergent
human understandings of the divine reality."s5
Eddy begins his critique by showing that Hick's attempt to ground the
notion of divine ineffability in the various traditions is ultimately a failure because
what Hick has in mind by the term 'ineffability' and what the thinkers of the
various traditions, or at least Christianity, had in mind are quite different. Hick
cites Augustine's declarative 'God transcends even the mind' and 8t. Thomas'
'The first cause surpasses human understanding and speech' as instances of
claims to divine ineffability in the Christian tradition. s6 Eddy claims that the
religious thinkers' notion of divine infinity and ineffability suggest that ''the divine
can never be exhaustively known. To admit that we can never know all of the
divine is a far cry from claiming that we can never know anything of the divine."S?
For Eddy, this ultra-subjectivist stance does serious damage to Hick's
realist position. He cites Feuerbach's observation that:
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To deny all the qualities of a being is equivalent to denying the being
himself ... The denial of determinate, positive predicates concerning the
divine nature is nothing else than a denial of religion, with, however, an
appearance of religion in its favor, so that it is not recognized as a denial;
it is simply a subtle disguised atheism ... Dread of limitation is dread of
existence. 88
Hick, however, does claim that while no substantial propositions can be applied
to the noumenal Real, there are some purely formal and relational propositions
that can be. "In this purely formal mode we can say of the postulated Real an

sich that it is the noumenal ground of the encountered gods and experienced
absolutes witnessed to by the religious traditions.,,89 Eddy notices though that
Hick is bringing in substance in his claims about the Real an sich. ''To speak of
purely formal properties is to speak solely in terms of relation, with absolutely no
substantive content whatsoever. But clearly to say that X has the property of
'being a referent of a term' does have some amount of substantive content. If
nothing else, it reveals that X 'can be identified by some human language
user,.,,90 For Eddy, all this shows the dilemma that Hick is in. "If, in reaction to
Feuerbach's challenge, he allows for some sUbstantive knowledge of the Real,
the heart of his pluralistic programme is betrayed. Thus, Hick is destined to walk
that neo-Kantian no-man's land that lies somewhere in an imaginary space
between religious realism and a thoroughly subjectivized anti-realism.,,91
Hick directly responds to this critique in his article entitled "Religious
Pluralism and the Divine: A Response to Paul Eddy". However, concerning
!
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Eddy's application of Feuerbach's argument to the noumenal Real, Hick avoids
the issue and simply states that:
It is of course true that, as Eddy says, it is possible to regard the entire
phenomenon of religious experience as being 'accounted for by those
religious concepts and sentiments found in religio-cultural systems and/or
in the individuals themselves', and thus fall in line with Feuerbach. But
this consideration is double edged. For the naturalistic option can be
invoked against non-pluralist as easily as against pluralist religious views.
It is not an argument that an exclusivist believer in the reality of the Divine
can use against a pluralist believer in the reality of the Divine.~2
In a footnote, Hick informs the reader that it is obvious from other writings that
Eddy is an exclusivist Christian. But Hick is failing to distinguish between the
argument and the person arguing. The argument that Eddy offers in this
particular critique still needs to be addressed by Hick, despite Eddy's views
offered in other works.
Moreover, the specific challenge of Feuerbach to which Eddy is pointing
would only apply to those, like Hick, that maintain that God (or 'the Real') is
completely unknowable. For Feuerbach, to posit the existence of an unknowable
God is to posit "a merely negative existence, an existence without existence, a
self-contradictory existence, - a state of being which, as to its effects, is not
distinguishable from non-being.,,93 This critique would not apply to those who
hold that certain positive predicates can be applied to God. In his response, Hick
seems to say that he does not need to respond to this Feuerbachian challenge
because Feuerbach, in other places, challenges the beliefs of Eddy.
Feuerbach's position that an existing unknowable God is indistinguishable from

92 John Hick, "Religious Pluralism and the Divine: A Response to Paul Eddy," Religious Studies 31 (1995):
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the non-existence of God is a challenge separate from his position that God is
simply a human projection.
While Eddy is astute in applying this critique to the philosophy of Hick, he
surprisingly misses an even stronger Feuerbachian challenge that applies
directly to Hick. While Feuerbach is critical of the position that God is completely
unknowable, he is even more critical of distinguishing between God an sich and
God as God appears to human consciousness. "But this distinction between
what God is in himself, and what he is for me destroys the peace of religion, and
is besides in itself an unfounded and untenable distinction. I cannot know
whether God is something else in himself or for himself than he is for me; what
he is to me is to me all that he is.,,94 To make the distinction between God an
sich and God as he appears requires a transcendental point of view which is in

actuality impossible. I can distinguish between an object as it is in itself and as it
appears "only where an object can really appear otherwise to me, not where it
appears to me such as the absolute measure of my nature determines it to
appear - such as it must appear to me.,,95
Feuerbach not only maintains the distinction that Hick is trying to make is
untenable and unfounded, but also that it is essentially irreligious.
To every religion the gods of otherreligions are only notions concerning
God, but its own conception of God is to it God himself, the true God God as he is in himself. Religion is satisfied only with a complete Deity, a
God without reservation; it will not have ?- mere phantasm of God; it
demands God himself.96
I
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This begins to raise the question of the practicality of Hick's hypothesis in the
various religious traditions, a question which will be returned to later.
In An Interpretation of Religion, Hick addresses the thought of Feuerbach
and other philosophers who have offered positive, non-realist interpretations of
religion. But he only critiques their non-realist application of religious language.
He rejects the Feuerbachian trade of preserving a certain value of God-talk by
showing that it refers to human ideals. While he critiques Feuerbach's positive
work, he does not respond to Feuerbach's text that can easily be applied as a
critique of the pluralistic hypothesis.

I
I
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Chapter 4

My Response

Before responding to John Hick's pluralistic hypothesis and the critiques
presented, it will be helpful to begin by briefly restating the factors that have
brought Hick to his position. As was shown through the dialogue with Alston,
Hick places great importance on religious experience for establishing the
rationality of religious beliefs for those that have religious experiences. It is, for
Hick, the essential element in justifying religious beliefs, for "Persons, if such
there be, who never experience religiously in any degree whatever cannot have
the same justification for belief.,,97
But Hick also distinguishes between the strong, vivid religious experiences
of the mahatmas and the religious experiences of the ordinary believer. Given
the intensity of the reported experiences of the mahatmas, it would actually be
irrational for the mahatmas not to trust this experience.

98

But it seems that the

ordinary believer always has a choice to make. This choice lies in how to
interpret the religiously ambiguous universe. "Religious belief does not properly
depend upon inference from evidences discovered in nature ... but upon
unconsciously interpreting the impacts of the environment in such a way that it is
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consciously experienced as having the kind of meaning articulated in religious
experience. In interpreting in this way the believer is making a basic cognitive
choice ... ,,99 While I have trouble understanding exactly how something that
occurs unconsciously (in this case the act of interpreting the universe) can be
called a choice, it nevertheless seems that, according to Hick, the way one
decides to interpret the world will affect the experience one has. These religious
experiences, although maybe not vivid or even memorable, "[make] it both
possible and reasonable to be so impressed by the reports of the mahatmas that
one's own experiences are supported by their much more massive awareness of
the transcendent.,,10o
At this point, Hick and I are in broad agreement. I agree that experience
plays a key role in the process of beliefs gaining the status of 'justified'. We all
experience the external world and are thus justified in believing in its existence
unless sufficient contrary evidence can be obtained. Likewise, those who
experience life as being lived in the unseen presence of God or a transcendental
Being are justified in believing in the existence of God unless sufficient contrary
evidence can be obtained. I also am in agreement with his argument for the
religious ambiguity of the universe; or in other words, I agree that sufficient
contrary evidence concerning the existence of Brahman/God/Allah/etc. has not
been (and possibly could not be) obtained.
I

I

However, all this leads Hick to ask the following question: "If the different
kinds of religious experience justify people in holding the incompatible sets of
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beliefs developed within the different traditions, has not our justification for
religious belief thereby undermined itself? Does it not offer an equal justification
for the acceptance of a number of mutually contradictory propositions?,,101 As we
saw in the Alston debate, Hick argues that the notion of 'one, true religion' does
undermine the justification of religious belief, hence the need for his pluralistic
hypothesis.
My critique of Hick will be two-fold. First, I will show that the argument
Hick gives for the need of his pluralistic hypothesis rests on a false premise.
Secondly, I will argue that even if I am wrong about this and the premise is true,
then Hick will be forced to thoroughly change his entire hypothesis. Thus, I will
argue that Hick either has to come up with a new argument for the need of his
hypothesis or change the hypothesis itself.
One reason for the invalidity of Hick's argument concerning the need for
his hypothesis is that Hick does not properly distinguish between the concepts of
justification and truth. In their debate, Hick critiqued Alston because Alston's
proposition that 'it is rational to base beliefs on religious experience' and his
assumption that 'there is at most one true religion' were contradictory because "if
only one of the many belief-systems based upon religious experience can be
true, it follows that religious experience generally produces false beliefs, and that
it is thus a generally unreliable basis for belief formation.,,102 However, if there is
only one true religion, then religious experience may generally produce false
beliefs (for that matter, sense experience may generally produce false beliefs),
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but it does not generally produce unjustified beliefs. Given that we are
epistemically cut off from 'truth', it is only justification that concerns us when
forming beliefs.
A simplified version of Hick's argument for the need of his pluralistic
hypothesis can be stated as follows:
1) Person A is justified in holding the belief that there is a personal, loving
God present in the world if this belief is based upon religious experience
and there is no strong evidence to refute this belief.
2) Likewise person B is justified in believing that that reality is non-dual if
this belief is based upon religious experience and there is no strong
evidence to refute this belief
3) It seems, then, that A and B are both justified in believing contradictory
things.
4) Given (3), it is implausible that all religious experience is illusion except
one's own.
5) Hence the Pluralistic Hypothesis which explains how each of the major
traditions, which each give evidence to show that they are valid responses
to the Real via their moral fruits, are in equal relation to the Ultimate
Reality.103
However, it seems that step 4 is an unwarranted move. If A recognized that B is
just as justified in believing something contradictory to what she is justified in
believing, she would not have to rationally admit that it is implausible that B's
contradictory beliefs do not correspond to reality. Keith Ward, in his article
103
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entitled "Truth and Religious Diversity" also notices this when he write, "Hick has
already argued that both atheists and theists can be rationally justified in
adopting the views of the world they adopt, given the ambiguous nature of that
world. But it does not follow that each must accept the other's view as equally
true.,,104
My point can be made clear by way of example from sense experience. If
I look into the sky and see an object that appears to me to be a bird, then I am
justified in believing that it is a bird provided there is not other evidence that
strongly suggest that this is not the case. If my neighbor Julie looks up into the
sky and observes the same object but it appears to her to be an airplane, she is
justified in believing that it is an airplane providing that no countervailing
evidence is available. If I notice that Julie is justified in believing that it is a plane,
and if I also recognize that it cannot be both a bird and a plane, I do not have to
admit that it is implausible that she is in some sense deluded. Actually, given my
justification for believing that it is a bird I would be internally justified in believing
that Julie is deluded. That is, given that I am 1) justified in believing that the
object is a bird, and that I am 2) justified in believing that Julie is justified in
believing that it is an airplane, I am therefore 3) justified in believing that Julie is
deluded.
However, this does not mean that Julie is in fact deluded, for the object
I·

could be a plane and, thus, I would be the one who

.
IS

deluded. So, the fact that

two people can be equally justified from the same type of experience in believing
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two contradictory propositions, does not require a belief that the two propositions
are equally true.
Perhaps Hick could counter Ward's point by pointing out that the atheist
and the theist are not in the same relation to one another as the theist and the
absolutist because the theist and the absolutist have the same type of
experience (religious experience) whereas the theist forms certain beliefs on a
type of experience that the atheist does not have. The question of reliability is
not as prevalent concerning sense experience because there is generally broad
agreement as to the nature of the experience. Great diversity of opinion does not
occur with beliefs formed from sense experience, so questions of its reliability are
not as acute as with religious experience. Hick may similarly counter my point by
arguing that contradictory reports from sense experience are the exception rather
than the rule so we do not have to view sense experience as an unreliable basis
for belief formation, for it is at least possible that it generally produces true
beliefs. However, religious experience does, as a rule, produce contradictory
propositions, so it seems that it is impossible for religious experience to generally
produce true beliefs, unless we understand this in another way, i.e. the pluralistic
hypothesis.
But Hick's argument for the need of his hypothesis faces further difficulties
in that it rests upon a heavily implicit and questionable assumption. Hick adheres
to an externalist/reliabilist theory of justification. "Most externalist theories of the
adequacy of grounds can be represented as reliabilist theories of various kinds,
the central idea of which (to put it now more carefully) is that grounds of a
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particular belief are adequate if (and only if) the particular. .. process of belief
formation belongs to a reliable kind ... A process is more reliable, the greater the
proportion of true beliefs it produces.,,105
Hick shows this to be his epistemological stance in the dialogue with
Alston. He argues that if only one religion is true then religious experience is an
unreliable basis for forming beliHfs. 106 This then leads him to the conclusion that
the 'one true religion' belief is "fatal to Alston's thesis that it is ... rational to base
beliefs on religious experience.,,107 For Hick, if there is at most only one true
religion, then religious experience is an unreliable basis for belief formation. If
religious experience is an unreliable basis for belief formation, then it cannot
adequately justify religious beliefs. Note that Hick does not admit the first
premise and, therefore, does not have to admit the conclusion. But he argues
that since Alston does admit the first premise, he must admit the conclusions.
But implicit in Hick's argument is the assumption that in order for a belief to be
justified, it must be arrived at by means of a reliable (or truth conducive) basis.
However, this assumption is questioned by more internalist theories of
justification. Internalist theories espouse the idea that the justification of a belief
is necessarily internal to the believer. 108 "The internalist insists that it is only the
subject's beliefs about whether a process is or is not reliable that are relevant to
the justification of a resulting belief, whereas for the externalist it is only the fact
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that the process is or is not reliable - whether or not the subject believes that that is relevant.,,109
While it would be entirely outside the scope of this paper to try and settle
the debate that continues betwElen externalistlreliabilist and internalist theories of
justification in favor of the latter, I can at least point out some of the major
objections to the former and show how this applies to Hick's episte~ological
position. 110 To begin with, it is important to note that "reliabilism does

not require

that the believer in question have any sort of cognitive access to the fact that the
belief producing process is in this way reliable in order for his or her belief to be
justified. All that matters for justification is that the process in question is in fact
reliable,,111 independent of what the believer happens to think about the process.
With this basic tenet in mind, consider a group of people who live in a
world that is controlled by a malicious demon of the sort imagined by Descartes.
This malicious demon controls all of the sensory and intuitive experiences of the
people, causing them to believe that a material world much like the one we
experience exists, when in fact no material exists. These people are just as
rigorous in their science and philosophy as we are, yet they form the false belief
that the external world that they experience exists and form many other false
beliefs based upon the deceptive appearance.
Intuitively, it seems that the people of this world are justified in believing in
the beliefs at which they arrive. For "their epistemic situation may, from their own
Swinburne, 21.
I am entirely indebted to Laurence Bonjour's article "Internalism and Externalism," The Oxford
Handbook of Epistemology, ed. Paul K. Moser (Oxford, New York: Oxford UP, 2002) 234-263, as the
source of the objections to externalism.
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subjective standpoints, well be entirely indiscernible from or even superior to our
own, so that if we are confident that our own beliefs are frequently justified, we
should seeming be equally confident that theirs are.,,112 But this is just what the
reliabilist denies. In light of this example, it seems that if the reliabilist theory of
justification is correct, it would be impossible to distinguish with certainty justified
beliefs from unjustified beliefs. Moreover, it seems to me that any claim that a
certain process is or is not reliable is itself a belief, which in order to be justified
by the reliabilist standard must also be formed on the basis of a reliable process.
Unless the reliabilists can provide an ultimate ground, this is the beginning of an
infinite regress.

Moreover, it is generally held that while externalist theories

regarding knowledge are plausible, externalist theories regarding justification are
much less so. ''The idea that knowledge is externally grounded and justification
internally grounded would help to explain why reliability theories are ... as
plausible as they are for knowledge, yet much less plausible for justification.,,113
Still, the debate over externalism and internalism is one that continues
today and there are also many objections to internalist theories of justification.
But even if externalism and Hick's basic point concerning the need for his
hypothesis are correct, then his hypothesis and even his entire definition of the
problem are much too limited in scope. For if we think about religion as a 'family
concept' so that it would include Marxism, Humanism, etc. then we would have to
I
conclude that given the diversity of opinions that are based on experience,
I

experience generally produces false beliefs unless we can come up with a
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hypothesis that sees all these ideologies as equally true. For instance, as Hick
notes, certain people interpret the world in a completely naturalistic way and thus
form the belief that only material exists. They may also, based upon experiences
of economic injustice and oppression, come to adhere to Marxism. Or, based on
their interpretation of their experiences, people may come to be Humanists,
extreme idealists, pantheists, etc.
Taken to a more general level, Hick's own critique of Alston can be used
against him. It is clear from his writings that Hick is a dualist and believes that
materialism and idealism are false. However, Hick also maintains that given the
ambiguous nature of the universe others can justifiably believe in materialism or
idealism if these beliefs are based on experience. But Hick's assumption that
only one of these can be correct is fatal to his empiricist position that it is rational
to base beliefs on experience. For if only one of these can be true it follows that
experience generally produces false beliefs, and that it is an unreliable basis for
belief formation. 114 Hick focuses our attention on transcendental religions and
then gives his argument that there is a problem of religious diversity that needs to
be addressed. However, if this is in fact a problem it is much wider than religious
diversity and is rather a problem of world-view diversity.
Keith Ward, in his critique of Hick, also notices something similar, but does
not focus upon it to question whether there is in fact a problem of religious
diversity. He states that:
"What [Hick] is doing is to pick out one class of religious beliefs, or one set
of religious phenomena which can be defined in terms of belief in a
transcendent salvific reality. There is nothing wrong with that; but it should
114
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be noted that it picks out one area of agreement in truth-claims by
definition. Faiths which lack that central belief are not going to be
counted; conversely, faiths which are counted are assured a minimal
degree of agreement to begin with ... But, so far, this is not really
pluralism (the acceptance of very different beliefs as equally valid); it is
exclusivism at a relatively abstract and general level (those are excluded
.
who do not believe in one transcendent salvific reality).115
But when this observation is made in conjunction with the argument Hick gives
for the need for his hypothesis, there does seem to be something wrong with
focusing attention on one type of religious belief, for it presents the alleged
problem to be much simpler than it actually is.
Thus, if Hick wants to continue to maintain that the argument he gives for
the need of his hypothesis is correct, then he needs to change his entire
hypothesis because it is much too limited in scope. His hypothesis would have to
explain how all or most rational world views can be viewed as being equally true
despite their differences, not just how all of the major post-axial religious faiths
can be seen as equally true. Conversely, if Hick wants to preserve his
hypothesis the way it is, he needs to give a different argument for the need of the
hypothesis. He needs to argue for what he simply assumes in the dialogue with
Alston, namely externalism/reliabilism; but at the same time argue that this
epistemological position somehow only applies to the beliefs of the religions he is
considering at not to beliefs in general. For if externalism/reliabilism holds for all
beliefs, then, given the diversity and mutual incompatibility of beliefs based on
experience in general, experience cannot be a reliable method in justifying
beliefs.

lIS
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In the absence of any new argument for the need of his hypothesis, I will
now argue for what I think does follow from Hick's observation that people can be
equally justified in believing contradictory religious propositions. If I recognize
that other people are equally justified in believing religious propositions that are
contradictory to my own, it seems that I must admit that my own religious views
are fallible and uncertain. This observation does not need to force me to
religious skepticism, for "just because it is possible for me to go wrong, it does
not follow that I can never go right.,,116 And while the position of religious
falliblism hedges those who hold it from religious skepticism on the one end, it
has the added advantage of hedging those who hold it from religious dogmatism
on the other. For while religious falliblism requires the observation that I could be
wrong, it also requires the observation that people from traditions different from
my own could be right in many important respects. Thus, it keeps my religious
beliefs open to constant revision. Moreover, on this observation, my proposal of
religious falliblism seems to be a "moderate, rational, balanced, Anglican-style
middle way,,117 of the kind of which Hick is so fond.
Hick seems to be concerned with opening up space for religious dialogue
and is interested to "move beyond the static situation of rival absolutisms.,,118 But
if this is a driving force for Hick in the creation of his hypothesis, then one should
notice that religious falliblism offers an alternative to Hick's way of accomplishing
this goal. For if I recognize that I could be wrong and others could be right, it
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becomes advantageous for me to listen to those with opposing religious views.
And while it would not be rational for me to accept religious propositions that
completely clash with my experience, I am kept safe from the 'static situation'
Hick mentions because religious fallibilism keeps my religious beliefs open to
constant revision. Moreover, Hick's pluralistic hypothesis has just as much
potential to be held dogmatically as any other religious system.
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Conclusion

Throughout this study of John Hick and religious pluralism, it has been
shown how Hick's insistence on the importance of religious experience in
justifying religious beliefs leads him to argue that there is a problem of religious
diversity that can only be successfully solved by his pluralistic hypothesis. The
two issues of the rationality of religious beliefs and religious pluralism are for Hick
inextricably linked, for the way he argues for the rationality of religious beliefs
pushes him to his religious pluralism. However, I have argued that one can
agree with the way Hick argues for the rationality of religious belief without
maintaining that there is a need for a pluralistic hypothesis. This can be done by
adopting an internalist theory of justification and by always keeping the distinction
between justification and truth sharp. In so doing, we do not have to follow Hick
down the road that Heim, Eddy, Feurerbach and others have shown is so riddled
with problems; but we must adopt an attitude of religious falliblism. By doing this
we avoid the extremes of skepticism and dogmatism and keep the line of
religious communication open. Moreover, we preserve an attitude of humility that
I '
is advocated by all of the great religious traditions.
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